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CONTROVERSY IN HEALTH CARE: A HARD LOOK AT NORTH
CAROLINA’S CERTIFICATE OF NEED LAWS
Suzanne L. Zelenka*
As health care costs continue to rise in the United States, patients
are frequently exposed to unaffordable and unpredictable medical
bills. In North Carolina, diagnostic imaging services such as MRI
scans can cost patients more than a month’s income. In response to
this, physicians like Dr. Singh of Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
have attempted to part ways with major hospitals in order to offer
quality medical procedures at lower, transparent prices. In states
like North Carolina, however, Certificate of Need (“CON”)
requirements prevent them from doing so by denying entities the
ability to purchase major medical equipment or to open new
facilities. Although CON programs were intended to lower health
care spending when first implemented in the 1970s, the federal
government has long-since declared these laws ineffective and even
detrimental to health care spending and health care quality in the
United States. However, CON programs have remained in effect in
many states due to powerful lobbying and legislative resistance to
reform. State CON programs, no matter the goals behind them,
function to insulate incumbent providers from competition and
allow those providers to set prices for services at arbitrarily high
rates. In 2018, Dr. Singh filed a law suit against the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services alleging that North
Carolina’s CON statute violates his personal rights to economic
substantive due process and equal protection under the North
Carolina Constitution, as well as the state’s constitutional
prohibition on monopolies and exclusive emoluments. North
Carolina’s judicial branch has the opportunity to decide this case
based on the traditional deference given to the state when applying
the rational basis test, or by looking at the evidence presented and
perhaps concluding that it does not support a finding of rationality.
*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2020.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which your physician says that you need a
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”) scan. This trip to the doctor
may have been caused by a car accident, a fall, or unusual abdominal
pain. You were not expecting to need an MRI at any point in the
foreseeable future. Can you afford to have the scan? How much will
it cost? Who do you ask to find out?
These are questions that the average patient in the United States
faces in a health care system known for its high prices,1 opaque
insurance practices, hidden fees, and general lack of transparency. 2
1

See Jamie Ducharme, The U.S. Spends Twice as Much on Health Care as
Other
High-Income
Countries,
TIME
(Mar.
13,
2018),
http://time.com/5197347/us-health-care-spending/.
2
See Lucas Laursen, How Efficiency Experts Lowered Health Care Prices at
One
U.S.
Hospital,
FORTUNE
(Aug.
22,
2018),
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They are also questions that physicians like Winston-Salem, North
Carolina surgeon, Dr. Gajendra Singh,3 see patients struggling with
in a state where the median annual household income is $50,320,
and the average per capita income is only $28,123 per year. 4 How
should you respond when your patient explains that the MRI scan
you ordered cost more than a month of her wages?5 The scan was
necessary to treat the patient’s physical problems, but between the
cost of the scan after insurance, the hospital facility fee,
administration fees, and physician fees, she is buried in debt.6
http://fortune.com/2018/08/22/healthcare-system-knee-replacement-costs/
(explaining that lack of transparency in health care costs has been a driving factor
behind the rising cost of health care).
3
Surgeon Gajendra Singh and Attorney Josh Windham Explain Challenge to
N.C. CON Law, CAROLINA J.: VIDEO (Nov. 28, 2018, 7:15 AM),
https://www.carolinajournal.com/video/surgeon-gajendra-singh-and-attorneyjosh-windham-explain-challenge-to-n-c-con-law/ [hereinafter Carolina Journal
Video].
4
QuickFacts:
North
Carolina,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/nc/INC110217#INC110217 (last
visited Jan. 22, 2019).
5
See Carolina Journal Video, supra note 3.
6
Because insurance coverage is not streamlined in the United States, the
percentage that insurance covers can vary dramatically from patient to patient. If
a patient needs an MRI before she has reached her deductible, she is responsible
for all expenses incurred prior to meeting that deductible amount. After reaching
the plan’s deductible (the amount of which varies per plan) then, depending on
the plan, the patient will either be responsible for a copayment or coinsurance (a
fixed percentage of the cost based on the plan) until she reaches the plan’s out-ofpocket maximum, at which point the insurance company is responsible for
additional covered expenses. Out-of-Pocket Maximums in 2019 are capped at
$6,750 for individuals and $13,500 for families. See Stephen Miller, 2019 HSA
Limits
Rise,
IRS
Says,
SHRM
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/2019-hsacontribution-limits-rise-irs-says.aspx. Additionally, where a patient goes for a
particular service is a huge variable for cost. Patients must be aware of their
networks, and whether the facilities they choose charge multiple fees for the same
service, which is the case with hospitals. Some insurers refuse to cover outpatient
diagnostic imaging performed in hospitals altogether because they are charged so
much more than if the same service were rendered at a free-standing center. See
Lydia Ramsey, The Cost of an MRI Can Vary by Thousands Depending on Where
You
Go,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Mar.
28,
2017,
11:12
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-an-mri-costs-by-state-2017-3.
Insurance issues aside, there are still millions of uninsured Americans. For
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Plagued by these concerns, Dr. Singh decided that there had to
be a better way to provide care to his community.7 He founded
Forsyth Imaging Center with the goal of providing X-rays,
echocardiograms, ultrasounds, CT scans, and MRI scans to his
patients at prices they can afford.8 Chief among his priorities was
eliminating the practice of charging multiple fees for the same
scans.9 Patients can see the price beforehand (prices are displayed
prominently online and in the office), use cash or insurance, apply
for a zero percent financing program, and if a patient finds lower
prices elsewhere, Forsyth will not only match that price, but will
take an additional fifty dollars off of the total cost of the service.10
Dr. Singh’s financial goals with regard to the imaging center are
simply to make enough money to cover the overhead costs and pay
his staff, and to provide patients with quality imaging at the lowest
possible price.11 As it stands today, however, a North Carolina law
is preventing Dr. Singh from realizing his vision of affordable
diagnostic imaging and is keeping prices high for North Carolinians
in need.
North Carolina is one of thirty-five states with a statute that
requires certain health care facilities to obtain a certificate of need
(“CON”)12 for many health care-related pursuits that involve new

example, one study found North Carolina’s uninsured rate rose to 15 percent by
the close of 2017. See Dan Witters, Uninsured Rate Rises in 17 States in 2017,
GALLUP (May 9, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/233597/uninsured-raterises-states-2017.aspx.
7
See North Carolina CON, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/north-carolinacon/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
8
See id.
9
See Complaint at 7–9, Singh v. N.C. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No.
18CV009498 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 2018), 2018 WL 5307689 [hereinafter
Complaint].
10
See id. at 9; see also Price List, FORSYTH IMAGING CTR.,
http://forsythimaging.com/price-list.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2019).
11
See Carolina Journal Video, supra note 3.
12
This paper uses the term “certificate of need” or “CON” because it deals with
North Carolina law. However, this term is used generally to refer to the state
practice of regulating the health care market by limiting supply on the basis of
“need” or “necessity” and is intended to include other iterations used by different
states.
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construction, expansion, or the purchase of medical equipment.13
North Carolina has one of the most comprehensive and heavily
regulated CON statutes in the United States today, and the red tape
often prevents physicians like Dr. Singh from providing affordable
care to patients. 14 North Carolina’s CON statute currently prohibits
Dr. Singh from purchasing an MRI scanner for his imaging center
unless the state issues his office a certificate of need,15 but he is
currently barred from even applying for one.16 Under the statute, the
state is responsible for determining an area’s projected “need” for
certain medical equipment and facilities and then incorporating that
into the State Medical Facilities Plan.17 Because the 2018 state plan
did not designate a need for an additional MRI scanner in Forsyth
County, where Dr. Singh’s office is located, he was unable to submit
an application.18
Even if he could apply for the MRI-CON, the application
process is prohibitively expensive, and there is a very low likelihood
that he would succeed in securing the certificate for his office,
despite having a business model that aims to reduce prices and
promote transparency for patients.19 This is because his

13

See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-175–131E-181 (2018) (listing all health care
facility activities that require a certificate of need in North Carolina).
14
See Katherine Restrepo, Certificate of Need, JOHN LOCKE FOUND.,
https://www.johnlocke.org/policy-position/certificate-of-need-laws/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2019) (discussing the North Carolina CON statute and its ranking among
the states for the amount of laws included within it).
15
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-178 (2018); see also Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
16
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 2, 11.
17
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-176(25) to 177(1)–(6) (2018).
18
See DIV. OF HEALTH SERV. REG., N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., 2018 STATE MEDICAL FACILITIES PLAN 150–51 (2017),
https://www2.ncdhhs.gov/dhsr/ncsmfp/2018/2018smfp.pdf.
19
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-182 (2018) (showing non-refundable
application fees). But see Complaint, supra note 9, at 33 (“Simply submitting an
application would cost Dr. Singh approximately $45,000 ($5,000 for the nonrefundable application fee, and about $40,000 to compile a successful MRI-CON
application). And because CON applications are almost always highly
competitive, it would likely cost Dr. Singh an additional $400,000 to litigate his
CON application through to the end . . . .”).
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competitors20 can challenge both his application and the state’s
finding of “need” for an additional scanner throughout the
application process.21 The statute not only allows challenges at the
agency level, but also grants challengers automatic standing to
request judicial review of agency certificate of need decisions in the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.22 Although a loophole in the law
currently allows Dr. Singh to rent a scanner two days per week, he
does so at exorbitant prices that are not financially compatible with
his goal of offering access to affordable care.23 It is time for states to

20

See Complaint, supra note 9, at 31 (indicating that all of the MRI machines
in Forsyth County at present are owned by two multi-billion-dollar hospital
groups).
21
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-188(b) (2018).
22
Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 9, at 25–27 (“All appeals from final
decisions in contested-case proceedings must be taken directly to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals within 30 days of written notice of the decision.”).
Because of the scarcity of “need” determinations, the process is extremely
competitive. Id. at 26. The administrative portion of a contested application can
take up to 270 days alone. Id. at 25. Competitors have every incentive to contest
and potentially litigate, which ultimately makes the process one that can only be
successfully navigated by entities with the most financial resources. Id. at 26–27;
see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY &
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REFORMING AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM THROUGH
CHOICE
AND
COMPETITION
56
(2018),
https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/Reforming-Americas-Healthcare-System-Through-Choiceand-Competition.pdf [hereinafter Choice and Competition] (“[I]ncumbent firms
may use CON laws to thwart or delay entry or expansion by new or existing
competitors. CON programs have also facilitated anti-competitive agreements
among competitors.” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Katherine Restrepo, North
Carolina’s Certificate of Need Law is One Reason Why Health Care Costs in
Charlotte Are So High, JOHN LOCKE FOUND. (June 15, 2016),
https://www.johnlocke.org/update/health-care-update-north-carolinascertificate-of-need-law-is-one-reason-why-health-care-costs-in-charlotte-are-sohigh/ (describing a law suit against a Charlotte, NC hospital group alleging
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act for contractually prohibiting insurance
companies from incentivizing subscribers to find lower cost service providers).
23
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 18, 29, 31 (indicating that renting a mobile
MRI machine is approximately $2,600 to $3,000 per day, plus administrative
fees). This is not tied into any assessment of the safety or quality of his office, as
an entity is required to meet those standards regardless of whether they rent
equipment or own it. Id. at 29–30.
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reexamine their CON statutes in light of illogical results that conflict
with the legitimate goals of health care reform.
This Recent Development will look at certificate of need
programs through the lens of the recent complaint filed by Dr. Singh
in the Wake County Superior Court, in order to examine the
economics, ethics, and outcomes behind certificate of need
programs. By analyzing the constitutional arguments presented in
that complaint in light of elevated state interest in matters of public
health, this Recent Development will explore the question of
whether the courts or the legislature are better suited to make
meaningful changes to the CON scheme. As it stands, the CON
program in North Carolina risks impeding innovative treatment
styles and potentially provides a safe haven for health care
monopolies. Ultimately, judicial deference to the state’s police
power will require opponents of CON to reframe the issue as an
arbitrary legal restraint on constitutionally protected economic
rights rather than as a “matter of public health.”
Part II of this Recent Development will explain the basic theory
behind certificate of need laws and will provide a brief history of the
CON regime at both the state and federal levels. Part III addresses
the real-world application issues that states face as a result of CON
laws. This part will assess research results and theoretical errors, as
well as the shifting policy goals used to justify certificate of need
programs. Part IV will look specifically at North Carolina, which
has one of the most expansive CON statutes in the United States,
and yet is the only state whose Supreme Court has declared a CON
statute to be in violation of the state constitution. Part V looks at the
interplay between public health, the state police power, and judicial
deference at both the federal and the state levels. The Recent
Development concludes by considering the constitutional issues
raised in Dr. Singh’s complaint in light of North Carolina’s judicial
precedents regarding the CON statute, substantive due process, and
state prohibitions on monopolies.
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II. INTERESTING IN THEORY: THE HISTORY OF CERTIFICATE OF
NEED PROGRAMS
Certificate of need statutes first emerged on the health care scene
in the 1960s as programs that potentially offered cost-containment
solutions.24 New York was the first state to enact a CON program in
1964, with a handful of states following in its footsteps that year,
and many more in the years to come.25 The original state laws
generally applied solely to hospitals and long-term care facilities,
requiring the government to assess whether there was need for new
facilities prior to the start of construction.26 Due to the particularities
of the health care market following World War II, there was
tremendous incentive to create new facilities, but relatively few
ways for government to influence what the private sector built and
where.27 This created a fear of redundancy in some areas and a lack
of available resources in others. Through CON programs, state
governments saw a method to control and direct health care
facilities’ resources and spending, and to prevent unnecessary
duplication of health care costs.28
24
See Emily Whelan Parento, Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care
Act Era, 105 KY. L.J. 201, 209–10 (2017) (“In most instances, the government
allows market forces to determine the appropriate supply of a product, and
consumers to purchase the amount of that product that meets their needs.
However, the market for healthcare services is not a normal market, and it is this
recognition that led to the development of health planning authorities and
ultimately to CON programs.” (footnote omitted)).
25
See id.; see also John D. Blum, Finding a New Regulatory Pathway for the
Old Labyrinth of Health Planning, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 213, 214 (2010) (noting
that Rhode Island, Maryland, and California also enacted CON programs in
1964). North Carolina’s original CON law was enacted in 1971. Determination of
Need for Medical Care Facilities, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1164 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-289–291) (repealed 1973).
26
See Joshua Tinajero, The Need to Repeal Certificate of Need Laws to Improve
America’s Health Care System: A Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis, 37 J.
LEGAL MED. 597, 598 (2017) (arguing that parties should challenge CON under
the Commerce Clause by arguing that CON laws facially and functionally
discriminate against out-of-state competitors).
27
See Parento, supra note 24, at 210 (explaining the regulatory issues following
the enactment of the Hill-Burton Act of 1946).
28
See id.; see also Patrick John McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform:
Reconsidering Certificate of Need Laws in a “Managed Competition” System, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 155 (1995).
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During this period, health care theorists suggested that there was
“a direct correlation between capacity and utilization; when
combined with the availability of third-party reimbursement,
oversupply of resources will create its own demand for excessive
use.”29 In other words, because of the provider reimbursement
practices used by insurance companies during this period, in which
providers were paid based on their cost per service plus a percentage
of additional profit, there was no incentive for facilities and
providers to closely monitor costs.30 For example, policymakers
believed that by artificially controlling the amount of hospital beds,
all of the beds in existing facilities would remain filled and
profitable. Furthermore, those beds would not be wasted on patients
whose conditions did not require in-patient hospitalization, but who
nevertheless might be hospitalized anyway by physicians and
hospitals looking to increase their profits.31 Additionally,
policymakers feared that if the supply of available beds increased,
lower demand per facility would cause the price of the empty beds
to be passed onto those patients (and their corresponding insurance
plans) actually occupying beds in any given facility.32
29
See Parento, supra note 24, at 210–11. This is known as “Roemer’s Law” or
the “Roemer Effect,” named for Milton Roemer, a health policy theorist who first
noted the relationship. See McGinley, supra note 28, at 155 (“In short, [the
Roemer Effect says] the effect of excess supply of health services is the
‘manufacture’ of demand.”).
30
See Parento, supra note 24, at 226; see also McGinley, supra note 28, at 184–
86 (explaining how managed care health care models have changed the
reimbursement structure since the 1980s, rendering CON statutes not only
redundant, but detrimental to cost saving).
31
See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need Laws: A Prescription for
Higher Costs, 30 ANTITRUST 50, 50–51 (2015). Ohlhausen explains another
iteration of the theory using competing hospitals A, B, and C. Hospital A gets an
expensive, brand-new MRI machine, so patients want to go to hospital A to use
the new machine instead of the old machines at hospitals B and C. Because of
this, hospitals B and C both buy new MRI machines. According to the theory,
now none of the hospitals has enough patients who require scans to recoup the
cost of the machine. Id.
32
See, e.g., In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542,
549 (1973) (“[Defendants contend] that the overhead cost of vacant beds must be
absorbed by the patients in the occupied beds and, consequently, the effect of
excess hospital bed capacity will be less efficient service to patients at greater
cost.”).
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This idea seemed reasonable to legislators at the time, and it had
the strong support of the American Hospital Association, who
lobbied tirelessly on behalf of CON regimes. 33 In 1974, Congress
took things a step further by passing the National Health Planning
and Resource Development Act (“NHPRDA”), a key component of
which was a mandate to all states, requiring them to enact legislation
establishing CON programs or else lose significant amounts of
federal funding for state-wide and local programs.34 Unsurprisingly,
forty-nine states (many of which already had CON statues) fell in
line with the federal mandate.35
Despite their rapid adoption throughout the United States, CON
programs quickly began to show signs that they were not all the
government hoped they would be. For example, a 1979 study found
that while the hospital bed growth rate slowed between 1968 and
1972, the average cost per patient per day actually rose. 36 The
national expenditures on health care continued to increase
exponentially, with the Department of Health and Human Services
reporting that in 1982, the country’s annual health care spending had
reached $332 billion, which was 10.5 percent of the gross national
product.37 In particular, expenditures on hospital care skyrocketed
from $52.4 billion in 1974 to approximately $230.1 billion in 1989.38
33

See Ohlhausen, supra note 31, at 51. Ohlhausen suggests it is not surprising
that the AHA and other hospital groups lobbied, and continue to lobby, for CON
programs which heavily restrict new competitors from entering into the health
care market. Id.
34
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (originally codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 300k–300n5) (repealed 1986).
35
See Chad A. Heiman, Shifting Purpose: Why Iowa’s Certificate of Need Law
is a Form of Economic Protectionism for Certain Iowa Health Care Providers
and Should be Repealed, 104 IOWA L. REV. 385, 393 (2018) (explaining that
because of the threat to cut funding, every state had adopted a CON program by
1980 with the exception of Louisiana).
36
See Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning:
The Economic Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 261, 269–70 (2001) (providing a thorough explanation of the
federal government’s early repeal of the CON mandate).
37
Id. (marking the first time that national health care costs had exceeded 10
percent of the gross national product).
38
McGinley, supra note 28, at 157.
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Members of Congress, dismayed by the law’s failure to control
health care costs, noted that the regulatory structure of many CON
programs was “a hindrance to flexible response by health care
providers,” and that the application process was “burdensome,
costly and cause[d] needless delays.”39 Unsurprisingly, Congress
repealed the NHPRDA in 1986, and the federal government now
strongly advises against the use of CON programs.40 However, to
this day there are still CON programs in thirty-five states and the
District of Columbia.41
III. FLAWED IN PRACTICE: THE DISAPPOINTING RESULTS AND
EVOLVING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STATE CON STATUTES
The reasons behind the failure of many states to repeal their
CON laws range from legitimate concerns about the unique nature
of the health care market to the more cynical fact that CON
programs have the wholehearted support of the wealthiest special
interest groups, which have political influence in state legislatures.42
39

Wolfson, supra note 36, at 270–71 (quoting U.S. Rep. Thomas DeLay). See
132 CONG. REC. 1460 (1986) for DeLay’s full remarks.
40
See, e.g., Joint Statement of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice on Certificate-of-Need Laws and South
Carolina House Bill 3250 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/joint-statement-federal-tradecommission-antitrust-division-u.s.department-justice-certificate-need-lawssouth-carolina-house-bill-3250/160111ftc-doj-sclaw.pdf
[hereinafter
Joint
Statement]. The FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ have strongly opposed
certificates of need as anti-competitive practices that shield incumbent providers
from the competition that would normally induce innovation, improvement, and
lower costs. Id. at 6–7. These federal entities are also critical of CON programs
because they delay entry into the market and make entry more expensive. Id.
41
See Richard Cauchi & Ashley Nobel, CON-Certificate of Need State Laws,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/concertificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx (last updated Feb. 28, 2019).
42
See Parento, supra note 24, at 231–32 (discussing the long-standing belief
amongst stakeholders that wealth, influence, connections, and resources play a
much bigger role than public policy concerns in the certificate of need process);
see also Ohlhausen, supra note 31, at 51 (“Government actors respond to political
pressure, often exerted by special interests that seek to place their own, narrow
interests ahead of the general public welfare.”); Matthew D. Mitchell, Do
Certificate-of-Need Laws Limit Spending? 16–20 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason U.,
Working Paper, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-
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CON programs have also continued to thrive because the health care
market is extremely complex and opaque, making it difficult to
decisively establish a cause and effect relationship between these
laws and the exorbitant amount of money the United States spends
on health care.43 Additionally, the policy goals of CON programs
have shifted over the years, in order to justify their continued use. 44
Furthermore, CON laws simply are not well known to the general
public, so it is not an issue that constituents write to their legislators
about or expect to be debated ad nauseam on the campaign trail.
Despite the various justifications for their continued use, certificate
of need programs have fundamental theoretical flaws that produce
results which tend to negate those justifications.
A. The Economics Behind Certificate of Need Requirements
CON laws represent a level of market regulation that is relatively
rare in the American economy and would probably not be accepted
outside of the notoriously complex health care market. Setting aside
the legal question of whether state police power should extend this
far in the name of “public health,” it is important to address how
these laws affect the market from an economic perspective. In her
harsh criticism of CON programs, Federal Trade Commissioner
Maureen Ohlhausen points out that “CON laws actively restrict new
entry and expansion [of the health care market]. They displace free
market competition with regulation and tend to help incumbent
firms amass or defend dominant market positions.”45 By artificially
restricting the supply of health care services, the government is
mitchell-con-healthcare-spending-v1a.pdf (discussing how various economic
models function under CON and suggesting that the non-normative “interestgroup model” is an explanation for the persistence of CON statutes, regardless of
their functionality and desirability).
43
See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann & Jacob W. Russ, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws
Increase Indigent Care? 16 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason U., Working Paper No.
14-20, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/do-certificate-need-lawsincrease-indigent-care.
44
See Parento, supra note 24, at 226–30. For example, although originally
envisioned as a predominantly economic strategy, over the years pro-CON
policymakers have extended their purpose to include policy goals like improving
health care quality and increasing access to charitable services. Id.
45
Ohlhausen, supra note 31, at 52.
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likely driving prices up and stifling the innovation that comes with
a competitive free market.46
It is absolutely true that the health care market is a different
animal than most commercial markets for a number of reasons.
Unlike the typical consumer of goods, “consumers” of health care
often have little or no knowledge about the services they purchase,
and they frequently have little walk-away power due to health
concerns.47 Generally, health care consumers are sick patients who
have no medical background with which to determine if a medical
service is rendered properly or is necessary for a particular
condition.48 Additionally, insurance providers tend to insulate health
care consumers from the actual cost of care, making it incredibly
difficult for a consumer to weigh the cost against the benefit of
treatment.49 Beyond this, “[i]t is difficult for patients to hold
providers accountable for cost comparisons because of the scarcity
of price information” and the extreme variation in cost from one
insurance plan to another.50 Proponents of CON programs often
point to these aspects of the health care market to support the
legislation, but the inherent lack of transparency in health care is
exactly why competition, or some other means of controlling
pricing, is vital to the health care market.51 Transparency and “wellproven and socially beneficial forces of free market competition” 52
are crucial to a patient’s ability to make financially sustainable
health care decisions, absent a single-payor or universal health care
system.
There is another side to the argument, of course. While CONsupporters acknowledge that certificate of need laws might be
unnecessary in a single-payor system, they argue that in the current
46

Id. at 51 (“Normally, if you want the price of something to decline, creating
an artificial shortage of it is not the way to achieve that. There is no clear reason
to expect that the basic laws of supply and demand would not apply . . . .”).
47
See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 36, at 262–64.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
See id. at 263.
51
See Parento, supra note 24, at 206 (“[C]onsumption of healthcare services
cannot be viewed as similar to consumption of a normal consumer product—most
healthcare services are ordered for patients . . . .”).
52
Ohlhausen, supra note 31, at 52.
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American health care system, the statutes provide much needed
regulation and limit the effects of capitalism in the health care
market.53 Fear of a free-market approach to health care is legitimate
because people need health care to be consistently affordable and
accessible.54 Although it is hard to find supporters of CON statutes,
it is not difficult to find instances where, for example, hospitals have
been forced to close their doors or have taken substantial economic
hits due to competition from ambulatory surgical centers, which
reduce their substantial out-patient surgery revenue.55 This is
particularly troublesome when a struggling hospital serves a rural
area where patients have limited options for care. CON program
proponents argue that ambulatory surgical centers “cherry-pick”
patients with the best insurance, often excluding Medicaid
beneficiaries.56 Unlike hospital emergency rooms, these surgery
centers are not required by federal law to accept patients regardless
of their insurance status.57 These are substantial concerns, but data

53
Mark Taylor, States Scrutinizing Certificate of Need Programs, HFMA (Feb.
17, 2017), reprinted in KENTUCKIANS FOR MORE HEALTHCARE OPTIONS (Feb. 18,
2017), http://www.kyhealthnow.org/state-scrutinizing-certificate-needprograms/ (citing retired state agency CON consultant, John Steen).
54
See Blum, supra note 25, for a well-rounded assessment of the need for health
planning and the problems with the current efforts to regulate through CON
programs.
55
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey Healthcare Sys., 675
F.3d 394 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a scheme devised to make up for loss of
business to ambulatory surgical centers violated the Stark Law).
56
See Matthew Glans, Research & Commentary: Certificate of Need Laws
Limit Access to Rural Hospitals, HEARTLAND INST. (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.heartland.org/publications-resources/publications/research-commentary-certificate-of-need-laws-limit-access-to-ruralhospitals?source=policybot.
57
Federal law under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act of 1986
(“EMTALA”) was enacted as a response to a practice among hospitals called
“patient dumping,” in which uninsured or underinsured patients were transferred
from one hospital to another (usually from a private hospital to a public one) for
non-medical reasons. In larger cities it was not infrequent in the 1980s for patients
to arrive at public hospitals in the back of cabs in medically unstable condition.
See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 178 (Barry R. Furrow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2018).
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has consistently failed to show that certificate of need laws do
anything to alleviate them.58
Undoubtedly, some measure of market regulation is needed, but
CON regimes have not been effective solutions. Two 2016 studies
of the economics behind CON programs stressed that although the
health care market is certainly different from traditional markets, the
basic theory of supply and demand still applies.59 In a supply-anddemand model, restrictions on supply will never reduce per unit
cost.60 “[Supply restriction] might reduce overall healthcare
expenditures . . . . But although reducing per unit cost is a worthy
goal, it is far from obvious that reducing overall expenditures [in
this manner] is desirable.”61 Normally, a supply restriction causes
the per unit price of a good or service to rise, while that increased
cost causes the quantity consumed to fall; thus, it is quite possible
that when these are balanced, overall expenditure will be lower.62
However, there are two key problems with focusing on the
reduction of overall health care expenditure. First, due to the thirdparty payor health insurance system in the United States, it is likely
that even as supply restrictions cause per unit prices to increase, the
quantity of services consumed will not fall as expected because
consumers are unaware of that increased cost.63 Of course, patients
still pay for these increased health care costs indirectly, through
higher insurance premiums or taxes, but there is a disconnect
because a patient does not experience this as a price increase of the
medical service itself.64 The less price-aware the average consumer
58
See discussion infra Section III.B; see also Blum, supra note 25, at 216–18
(“All too often, regulation is a response to market failures or abuses, but without
strategic planning backing regulatory responses, such interventions are stop gap
measures that often only incite abuses in other areas of the delivery system.”).
59
See Mitchell, supra note 42, at 6; see also James Bailey, Can Health
Spending Be Reined in through Supply Constraints?: An Evaluation of
Certificate-of-Need Laws 9 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason U., Working Paper,
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Bailey-CON-v1.pdf (discussing
the economic theories used to analyze CON programs).
60
Mitchell, supra note 42, at 5.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 7.
64
Id.
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is, the more off-balance the demand model will be, so the supply
restriction is just as likely to increase overall expenditure as it is to
reduce it.65 Second, if overall expenditures do decrease, “they do so
only by restricting the availability of services, limiting consumer
choice, and reducing consumer welfare.”66 In other words, the only
way CON programs successfully achieve lower health care spending
is if they succeed at restricting health care utilization enough to
compensate for the increase in per-service price.
The root of the issue, and a key factor that sets health care apart
from other markets is that people are always going to need medical
care, regardless of the price. If prices disincentivize people from
seeking preventive care or needed medical treatment, the temporary
expense saved is likely to turn into a larger expense down the line.67
While issues like “moral hazard” are present in the health care
market,68 patients typically get medical care at the direction of
physicians.69 Even with the push towards consumer-driven health
care, patients cannot make fiscally responsible medical decisions if
they do not have access to pricing information until after the services
are rendered.70 The degree to which CON requirements contribute to
higher pricing only exacerbates these health care market-specific
quirks. CON laws have not accomplished what they set out to do, at
least in part because they have incentivized monopolistic practices

65

Id.
Id.
67
See Ateev Mehrotra et al., Promise and Reality of Price Transparency, NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1348, 1350 (2018) (explaining the complications with “consumer
driven health care,” and pointing out that methods like imposing high deductibles
may decrease overall spending, but the reduction comes from patients simply
declining to seek care because of the price).
68
See Bailey, supra note 59, at 12–14 (referencing the insurance concept of
moral hazard, a theory observed in the health insurance industry that people who
have insurance typically use more services and take more risk).
69
See Mehrotra et al., supra note 67, at 1351 (“Patients also value staying
within the same health system to ensure that their care is coordinated, and if their
physician recommends a given facility for a test or another clinician for a referral,
patients are loath to override that recommendation simply on the basis of price.”).
70
Id. at 1348–51.
66
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without regulating prices in a market where utilization reduction can
only go so far to cut costs.71
B. Justifying Certificate of Need Laws: Lofty Goals and
Realistic Results
As mentioned above, states initially established CON programs
to combat the consequences of the “cost-plus” method of provider
reimbursement, in which physicians and hospitals received more
insurance money the more they spent per patient.72 Today, however,
most indemnity and cost-plus contracts have been replaced by
managed care organizations (“MCOs”), which negotiate
reimbursement rates contractually with provider networks.73
Medicaid has also largely transitioned from traditional fee-forservice models to managed care networks, alleviating the risk that
providers will not accept Medicaid.74 This shift has removed much
of the early justification for enacting CON statutes because managed
care employs both supply-side and demand-side controls aimed to
reduce costs.75 Largely because of this radical shift in the structure
of the health care market, alternate policy goals have emerged to

71

Reduction in utilization of health care will always have practical limitations,
the first being that people rely on health care in its myriad forms to live. Secondly,
from a more economic standpoint, insurance prices impose artificial caps on
patient costs. Utilization reduction efforts in modern insurance plans such as high
cost-sharing often do not combat this because the costs of services have become
so high that a patient can reach a high deductible with one service. See id. at 1350–
51.
72
See discussion infra Part I.
73
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 57, at 63. MCOs contract with providers to
create networks for their subscribers to use at discounted rates. Id. They further
attempt to control costs through frequent utilization review, capitation payment
models, integrated delivery systems, cost-sharing, and reference pricing. Id. at 63–
70. MCOs have experienced some success at reducing costs over the years, but
generally health care spending continues to rise. Id. at 63; see also McGinley,
supra note 28, at 161–74 (explaining that CON programs and managed care or
managed competition are incompatible).
74
Medicaid Transformation, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.ncdhhs.gov/assistance/medicaid-transformation (last visited Mar. 6,
2019).
75
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 57, at 62–75.
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justify retaining CON programs.76 These include: (1) increasing
charitable care; (2) ensuring access to care (including rural access to
care); and (3) increasing the quality of care.77
There is nothing unusual about this list. In fact, a health care
policy that does not include each of these goals would be suspect.
What is unusual, however, is that studies find either a negative or a
neutral correlation between CON programs and desired policy
outcomes when data is compared between CON states and nonCON states.78 Most recently, researchers at the Mercatus Center
have conducted several thorough studies regarding the efficacy of
CON programs. When assessing patient accessibility to diagnostic
imaging in CON states compared to non-CON states, they found that
states with CON programs typically have fewer non-hospital
services,79 reduced overall numbers of providers,80 and reduced
availability of imaging services.81 The same study also found that
states requiring certificates of need for diagnostic imaging
equipment generally had higher numbers of residents who travel out
of state to receive services.82 The data also showed that states with
CON requirements file fifty-one percent more hospital claims (as
opposed to non-hospital claims) for diagnostic imaging services
than non-CON states.83
76

See, e.g., Parento, supra note 24, at 223–30 for a comprehensive analysis of
these policy justifications.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann & Matthew C. Baker, Are Certificate-of-Need
Laws Barriers to Entry?: How They Affect Access to MRI, CT, and PET Scans
19–20 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason U., Working Paper, 2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Stratmann-CON-Barriers-to-Entry.pdf.
79
See, e.g., id. at 17.
80
Id. at 17–19 (showing statistically significant differences at the ten percent
level for all non-hospital services and indicating that this is some evidence that
non-hospital providers may be reduced because they are barred from market entry
by CON requirements).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 20.
83
Id. at 16–17 (“For the MRI utilization regressions, the point estimate on MRICONs implies that in states with these CON regulations, 51 percent more MRI
claims are filed by hospitals than by other providers, as compared with states
without these regulations. That finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the
MRI-CONs benefit hospitals relative to other providers.”). CT and PET scan data
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Another study produced statistically significant results
indicating that states with CON statutes are consistently associated
with fewer rural hospitals.84 Additionally, studies have suggested
that CON laws have negative correlations with the overall quality of
care,85 as well as with the accessibility of care in general.86 Research
findings have also indicated that no statistically significant
implications exist regarding CON programs’ effect on the provision
of charitable care, not to mention relying on CON programs to
provide care to the uninsured, which has drawn harsh criticism from
scholars in the field.87 Although these findings in no way suggest
show similar trends. Id. at 17. This is particularly concerning when considering
the previously mentioned elevated expense of hospital services.
84
See Thomas Stratmann & Christopher Koopman, Entry Regulation and Rural
Health Care: Certificate-of-Need Laws, Ambulatory Surgical Centers, and
Community Hospitals 15–17 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason U., Working Paper,
2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Stratmann-Rural-Health-Carev1.pdf (stressing that the stated purpose for regulating ASCs under CON
programs is because of the claim that these centers take away outpatient business
from hospitals, leading to economic peril for rural hospitals, but in reality states
with ASC-CON requirements have both fewer rural ASCs and fewer rural
hospitals).
85
See, e.g., id. (indicating that of all measures in this study, the largest statistical
difference found is in deaths following serious post-surgery complication, where
there is an average of six more deaths per 1,000 patient discharges in CON states
than in non-CON states). Regulation through CON programs can affect health
outcomes in more direct ways too—for example, in Virginia a newborn died after
a complication resulted in early delivery that required a high tech NICU. The baby
was delivered at a hospital without this equipment, having applied for and been
denied a CON to expand its neonatal unit due to lack of “need.” There was a
hospital six miles away with the specialty equipment, but the only ambulance that
could transport the baby safely was out on another call. Eric Boehm, How
Virginia’s Hospital Licensing Laws Led to an Infant’s Death, REASON (Jan. 25,
2017),
https://reason.com/archives/2017/01/25/virginia-certificate-of-needhospital.
86
See Stratmann & Russ, supra note 43, at 10–11, 14 (explaining that the
regression analyses showed that states with CON programs have 99 fewer hospital
beds per 100,000 people than those without CON programs, and when controlling
for only CONs that regulate acute hospital beds, those states have an average of
133 fewer beds per 100,000).
87
See Ohlhausen, supra note 31, at 52–53 (suggesting that the competition
insulation benefits for incumbent providers are unevenly distributed based on
arbitrary factors, like area population, that have nothing to do with how much
indigent care is provided, and that a better way to insure the provision of indigent
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that repealing or reforming CON regulation is the miracle cure-all
for our ailing health care system, they certainly illustrate that the
perceived benefits of CON programs do not outweigh the harm they
cause to people like Dr. Singh and his patients. Though a state may
indicate a “rational” basis behind a law, if after fifty years, the law
does not yield the desired results and continues to encroach upon the
rights of citizens, courts should intervene to uphold those rights.88
IV. NORTH CAROLINA’S COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH
CERTIFICATE OF NEED
North Carolina has a complicated history with its CON program.
Today, the state has one of the most comprehensive CON statutes in
the United States.89 The average state with a CON program regulates
approximately fourteen categories of medical services while North
Carolina’s statute regulates twenty-five separate categories of health
care facilities and medical equipment.90 Additionally, North
Carolina’s CON program is stringently enforced.91 Despite
consistent efforts in the state legislature, attempts to reform the
care would be for states to directly fund it); see also Parento, supra note 24, at
224–25 (“[I]ncumbents argue that the guarantee of restricted competition allows
them to negotiate higher prices with private insurance companies, thereby
conferring a larger profit margin, which allows for more resources to provide care
to poorer patients without insurance.”). Studies have not shown a statistically
significant difference in the amount of indigent care actually provided by hospitals
in CON states compared to non-CON states, however. Id. at 225; see also
Stratmann & Russ, supra note 43, at 14, 30 (looking at uncompensated care as the
sum of hospital-level uncompensated care in a state divided by the number of beds
in the reporting hospitals).
88
See discussion infra Part V.
89
See CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN & THOMAS STRATMANN, CERTIFICATE-OFNEED LAWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH CAROLINA 2 (Mercatus Ctr., Geo. Mason
Univ., 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Koopman-Certificate-ofNeed-NC-MOP_1.pdf (“North Carolina’s CON program currently regulates 25
different services, devices, and procedures, which is much more than the national
average.”)
90
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-177(4) (2018).
91
See Restrepo, supra note 14 (providing an overview of CON laws in North
Carolina); see also KOOPMAN & STRATMANN, supra note 89 (explaining that
while North Carolina’s policy is among the strictest, it also presents the state
legislature and the Department of Health and Human Services with an opportunity
to “reverse course” and make a notable change).
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statute have largely been unsuccessful.92 Although it ranks third
among the nation’s most restrictive CON statutes, North Carolina
has the distinction of being the only state whose Supreme Court has
ruled that a CON program is in violation of the state constitution.93
A. The CON Law That Almost Wasn’t: The North Carolina
Supreme Court Decision in Aston Park
The North Carolina Generally Assembly enacted the state’s first
CON law in 1971. That same year, Aston Park Hospital applied for
a certificate of need to build a new, larger facility in the Asheville
area.94 The governing state agency denied the hospital’s application,
on the grounds that the new facility “would be an unnecessary and
weakening duplication of services and undesirable dilution of
physicians’ time in treating patients at widely separated hospitals.”95
When the CON statute was enacted, the state designated a need for
94 additional hospital beds in the area, but 90 of those were already
approved to be provided by another hospital whose plans were
finalized prior to the passage of the CON statute.96 Aston Park
92
See e.g., Dan Way, Certificate of Need May Be on the Chopping Block,
Again, CAROLINA J. (Mar. 28, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com
/news-article/certificate-of-need-may-be-on-the-chopping-block-again/
(discussing a 2017 Senate Bill aimed at phasing out the CON statute). Certificate
of Need reform has been a strangely partisan issue, with republicans traditionally
in favor of deregulation. This mirrors typical health care debates, in which
conservative-leaning politicians (in both parties) push for managed competition,
whereas liberals are in favor of government regulation of the health care market,
but CON laws do not actually seem to achieve desired policy goals. If the
government controlled the pricing of services in addition to restriction through
CON programs it would certainly be a more typical ideological debate such as the
free-market versus universal health care discussion. As it stands now, however,
CON programs favor large hospital incumbents and do not control how much
those certificate holders charge for services.
93
See Robert M. Anderson, The Judiciary’s Inability to Strike Down
Healthcare Service Certificate of Need Laws Through Economic Substantive Due
Process: A Call for Legislative Action, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 703, 720 (2008).
94
In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park, 282 N.C. 542, 542–43 (1973).
95
Id. at 543 (quoting the explanation given to Aston Park Hospital by the North
Carolina Medical Care Commission, which then served the role that the State
Health Planning and Development Agencies would take on after the passage of
NHPRDA).
96
Id.
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challenged the state decision on the grounds that the statute violated
Article I, Sections 1, 19, 32, 34, and Article II, Section 1 of the North
Carolina Constitution.97
After hearing the hospital’s argument, the North Carolina
Supreme Court struck down the 1971 CON statute as
unconstitutional, carefully distinguishing a certificate of need
requirement from the state’s legitimate interest in enacting licensing
requirements that govern facility quality and safety standards.98
While the court did not address each constitutional violation
separately, it concluded that “the Constitution of [North Carolina]
does not permit the Legislature to authorize a state board or
commission to forbid persons, with the use of their own property
and funds, to construct adequate facilities” merely because there is
a fear that competition might adversely affect other hospitals.99
Regarding Article I, Sections 32 and 34, (North Carolina’s
constitutional prohibitions on exclusive emoluments and
monopolies, respectively) the court expressed that, although the
health care market is quite different to other markets in some
respects, “[the court] know[s] of no reason to doubt its similarity
thereto in its response to the spur of competition.”100 The court
expanded on this by clarifying that in industries like public utilities,
where competition is undesirable, “the State has undertaken to
protect the public from the customary consequences of monopoly
by making the rates and services of the certificate holder subject to
regulation and control by the Utilities Commission.”101 Under the
CON regime, however, no such rate regulation existed, and the
artificial creation of monopolies could not be reconciled with their
constitutional prohibition.102 The court also specifically delved into
a due process analysis under Article I, Section 19, concluding:
[I]t is necessary to a valid exercise of the police power that the proposed
restriction have a reasonable and substantial relation to the evil it
purports to remedy. We find no such reasonable relation between the
97

Id.
Id.
99
Id. at 549.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 550.
102
Id. at 549.
98
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denial [of Aston Park’s CON application] . . . and the promotion of the
public health.103

The court ultimately held that the certificate of need statute had
violated Aston Park Hospital’s substantive due process rights,
guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution, in addition to the
anti-monopoly and anti-exclusive emoluments clauses.104
It is not often a state’s highest court holds a statute in violation
of so many constitutional principles, but Congress ultimately
rendered the judgment in Aston Park moot when it enacted
NHPRDA in 1974.105 In Morrow v. Califano,106 North Carolina sued
to challenge the provision of the federal statute which mandated that
state legislatures enact CON laws.107 The state argued that the
mandate represented an unconstitutional interference with the North
Carolina Constitution and the state’s legislative process; thus, the
state contended that it was overly coercive and violated the
principles of state sovereignty and federalism.108 The District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina rejected those arguments,
concluding the federal government action was constitutional.109
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has never actually
overruled its decision in Aston Park, the state legislature enacted a
new CON statute in 1977 pursuant to the federal mandate in
NHPRDA.110 “The Morrow decision, thus, merely confirmed the
legislature’s federally endorsed circumvention of Aston Park.”111
Despite the outcome of North Carolina’s attempt to challenge the
103

Id. at 551.
Id. at 550–52.
105
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (originally codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 300k–300n5) (repealed 1986); see also discussion infra Part II.
106
445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff’d mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
107
Id. at 533.
108
See id.
109
Id. at 534 (“We perceive nothing unconstitutional either in the purposes of
the Act or in the condition thereby attached to health grants made to the States
under federal health programs.”).
110
See Joshua A. Newberg, In Defense of Aston Park: The Case for State
Substantive Due Process Review of Health Care Regulation, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 253,
260 (1990).
111
Id.
104
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constitutionality of certificate of need laws in the 1970’s, some
scholars believe that, absent the federal mandate, CON laws should
now be challenged under a substantive due process analysis.112
B. North Carolina’s CON Statute Today
Perhaps to counteract the Aston Park court’s assertion that CON
programs did not reasonably relate to the promotion of public health,
the preamble to the current North Carolina CON statute states
several grounds that directly link it to the state’s legitimate interest
in the furtherance of public health.113 These include controlling the
cost, utilization, and distribution of health care facilities to guarantee
equal access to services; reducing the duplication and unnecessary
use of medical services; and alleviating the “enormous economic
burden on the public.”114 With this strong public health justification
for the statute, the legislature clearly sought to implicate the state’s
police power, potentially deterring future constitutional challenges
to the law.115
In addition to setting forth the types of activities it regulates, the
statute also establishes the criteria that will be considered upon
review of an application.116 The list is extensive, and one can easily
understand how an entire industry has grown around CON
application consulting, without which the average physician could
never hope to satisfactorily address all of the criteria listed.117 In Dr.
See generally id. (suggesting that in instances representing a “legislative
failure,” courts are justified in engaging in substantive due process review of
economic legislation, and that state courts with elected judges are particularly
positioned to take on this role when action is called for); see also Anderson, supra
note 93 (explaining the judiciary’s unwillingness to interfere in certificate of needrelated issues, and advocating for a shift back to means-ends scrutiny for
economic substantive due process issues).
113
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-175 (2018).
114
Id.
115
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 131–38 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining the state public health powers in the
modern constitutional era).
116
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-183 (2018).
117
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 23 (alleging that, because of the extensive
review criteria, a CON applicant must hire a team of experienced consultants and
economic specialists to successfully generate the data, plans, and projections
required); see also, e.g., North Carolina: Certificate of Need (CON) Overview,
112
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Singh’s case, for example, he alleges that the price of preparing an
MRI-CON application would cost him around $40,000 in preapplication consulting fees and would probably take many months
to complete.118 Among other things, an application must identify the
population to be served and demonstrate the need for the services
within that population, specifically highlighting any minority
groups to be served.119 An applicant must also show that her proposal
is the most fiscally sound by providing financial and operational
projections, showing availability of resources and qualified
personnel, and demonstrating that any enhanced competition will
have a positive impact upon cost effectiveness, quality, and access
of the services proposed.120
The requirements themselves, while burdensome, seem to
reflect sound public health goals. However, even upon successfully
meeting all of the requirements, an applicant is still more likely to
be rejected than not, particularly for MRI-CONs.121 In his complaint,
Dr. Singh alleges that the state’s “competitive-review” system is
responsible for this because it allows NCHHS to reject applications
simply because another application is chosen to fill that area’s
“need.”122 The review system also gives competitors a 30-day period
to submit comments and exhibits challenging the representations
made in the application.123 Dr. Singh’s complaint also indicates that
the scarcity of new “need” determinations for fixed MRI scanners
ensures that MRI-CONs are always subject to competitive review,
and typically the application is the subject of several challenges
from competitors during the 30-day window.124 If the agency
RES. & PLAN. CONSULTANTS, LP, https://www.rpcconsulting.com/certificate-ofneed/north-carolina/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
118
Complaint, supra note 9, at 23. The $40,000 is on top of the application fee,
as well as the cost of hiring an attorney to navigate the challenges that will likely
arise once the CON application has been submitted. Id.
119
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-183(3) (2018).
120
Id.
121
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 26–27.
122
See id. at 24 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-183(a)(1)).
123
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-185(a1)(1) (2018).
124
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 26 (“Given the scarcity of new need
determinations for fixed MRI scanners and the adversarial nature of these
proceedings, qualified providers eager to offer new services to patients are forced
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approves an application, these challenges continue in the form of
administrative hearings and potentially litigation in the state court
system.125 Dr. Singh argues that MRI-CONs are extremely valuable
because they confer the “tremendous economic advantage that
comes with holding exclusive legal rights to own and operate [MRI]
scanners” in a particular service area.126 This incentivizes incumbent
MRI-CON holders to challenge all new CONs in the area.127
V. IS FORSYTH IMAGING THE NEXT ASTON PARK?
The complaint filed by Dr. Singh against the North Carolina
Department of Health and Human Services requests that the court
grant the plaintiff declaratory and injunctive relief, on the grounds
that North Carolina’s CON statute violates the state’s constitution.
Specifically, the complaint alleges violations under the following
provisions: (1) the anti-monopoly clause of Article I, Section 34; (2)
the exclusive emoluments clause in Article I, Section 32; (3) the
substantive due process guarantee in Article I, Section 19 (Law of
the Land clause); and (4) the equal protection guarantee in Article I,
Section 19.128 Essentially, the alleged constitutional violations
mirror those which persevered against the CON statute forty-six
years ago in Aston Park.129
Since that time, however, there have been no successful
constitutional challenges to the statute. The judicial branch has
continuously upheld state CON programs as a legitimate exercise of
the state’s police power, through which states have an inherent
authority to enact and enforce laws to protect and promote “the
to aggressively compete with one another—not in the marketplace [by lowering
rates and providing top quality services], but in the CON-application process.”).
125
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-188 (2018). Following administrative hearings,
“[a]ny affected person who was a party in a contested case hearing shall be entitled
to judicial review of all or any portion of any final decision . . . . The hearing shall
be to the Court of Appeals . . . .” Id. § 131E-188(b).
126
Complaint, supra note 9, at 26.
127
Id. (“[I]ncumbent MRI providers frequently file written comments and
petitions for contested-case hearings in an attempt to stonewall the introduction
of new, competing MRI scanners.”).
128
Id. at 34–38.
129
See id.; see also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park, 282 N.C. 542, 546
(1973).
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health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the people.”130 Laws
enacted for the advancement or the preservation of public health are
likely to survive most constitutional challenges in both federal and
state courts, as this type of government action exemplifies a
compelling state interest.131 Public health, in particular, brings to the
forefront an inherent ideological tension in the United States
between the desire for limited government and the idea that our
government should protect the health and wellbeing of its citizens.132
This conflict reflects the tendency of public health laws to clash with
individual liberties that are considered most fundamental to an
American way of life. Because of that struggle, it is all the more
important for courts to engage with these cases.
A. North Carolina’s Law of the Land Clause Will Not
Invalidate the State’s CON Statute
Dr. Singh and the Forsyth Imaging Center allege that the CON
requirement, both on its face and as applied, violates the substantive
due process and equal protection rights guaranteed by the North
Carolina Constitution’s Law of the Land Clause.133 The complaint
asserts that because “the MRI-CON requirement lacks a real and
substantial (or even a rational) relationship to protecting the health
or safety of North Carolina patients,” it violates Dr. Singh’s
substantive due process right to freely participate in the health care
market without being subjected to “arbitrary, irrational, and
protectionist legislation.”134 The equal protection allegation
challenges the statute on the grounds that it makes an arbitrary
distinction between CON-holders and providers without a CON
because whether a provider is permitted to own an MRI scanner
under the law is not based on that provider’s ability to provide safe
and affordable MRI scans.135 Although these claims reflect
130

See Michael R. Ulrich, Law and Politics, an Emerging Epidemic: A Call for
Evidence-Based Public Health Law, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 256, 260 (2016) (quoting
GOSTIN, supra note 115).
131
See GOSTIN, supra note 115, at 141–42.
132
See Ulrich, supra note 130, at 261–62 (expressing this tension between the
social compact theory and the theory of limited government).
133
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; see Complaint, supra note 9, at 36–38.
134
See Complaint, supra note 9, at 36–37.
135
Id. at 37–38.
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seemingly logical reasoning, neither are likely to succeed because
of the relationship between the judicial branch and the state police
power. In balancing the economic liberty interest with the state’s
interest in “public health,” courts hearing this case will apply
rational basis review, which is notoriously deferential to the
legislature.136 Under a rational basis test, modern courts generally
refuse to consider the actual rationale behind a particular policy or
its effectiveness, curtailing the substantive analysis of claims like
Dr. Singh’s.137
Although it is unlikely that the Law of the Land Clause
challenge will succeed here, this case does present the judiciary with
an occasion to reconsider the level of deference actually required
when adjudicating matters of public health, as well as whether this
case fits into that category. In what is regarded as the foundational
public health law case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,138 the Supreme
Court recognized that a state has the authority to limit individual
liberty to the extent necessary to promote public health and safety,
including enforcing mandatory vaccinations, quarantines, and other
measures that would otherwise be considered a gross abuse of
power.139 That said, state police power, while substantial, is not
unlimited. The Jacobson opinion, considered settled doctrine since
1905, “established a floor of constitutional protection for individual
rights, including five standards of judicial review: necessity,
reasonable methods, proportionality, harm avoidance, and
136
See GOSTIN, supra note 115, at 137–40 (“Rationality review almost always
results in a finding that police power regulation is constitutional.”). The reason
behind the application of rational basis review instead of a stricter level of scrutiny
is that courts since the Lochner era have designated economic liberty interests to
be non-fundamental in most cases, and this case does not implicate discrimination
against a protected class like race, sex, national origin, or disability. Id.; see also
Anderson, supra note 93, at 730 (explaining that certificate of need laws will
survive the rational basis standard for economic substantive due process).
137
See GOSTIN, supra note 115, at 138–39 (“Scientific evidence is the raison
d’être of public health action, Yet, in a rational basis review, the state is not
obligated to produce scientific evidence. ‘A legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom fact finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.’”).
138
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
139
Id. at 24–25.
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fairness.”140 However, the judicial branch has largely determined
that a traditional rational basis review of substantive due process and
equal protection challenges to CON statutes is appropriate.141
Courts do not make factual inquiries under rational basis review,
and certainly do not explore whether legislation is based on peerreviewed, scientific, or economic evidence.142 Although the judicial
branch claims that the legislature is best situated to address matters
of public policy, nothing ensures that the legislature’s public policy
determinations have any rational relation to the ends they intend to
achieve. “This lowest standard of review does not force public
health authorities to justify their actions by demonstrating a
significant risk and showing the intervention is likely to ameliorate
that risk; nor does it usually require authorities to justify targeting
particularly vulnerable or unpopular groups.”143 Although there are
dangers of an overly powerful judiciary, the same is true for the
legislature. Courts should be willing to analyze all of the facts
presented, particularly when liberty interests are at stake.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has indicated that
the guaranteed protections of the state constitution are intended to
be interpreted broadly compared to those in the Federal
Constitution,144 in Hope—A Women’s Cancer Center, P.A. v. North
Carolina,145 the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not apply any
heightened scrutiny when reviewing the plaintiff’s economic
140

GOSTIN, supra note 115, at 130–31.
Id. at 138–39.
142
Id. at 139; see also Ulrich, supra note 130.
143
GOSTIN, supra note 115, at 140.
144
See J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of North Carolina
Constitutional Protection in the New Millennium, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 238
(2005) (explaining potential for the North Carolina Constitution to be interpreted
as having far more broad protections for individuals than the Federal Constitution
while discussing Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992)) (citing State v.
Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769 (1949)); see also, e.g., Good Hope Health Sys. v.
N.C Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 189 N.C. App. 534 (2008) (reviewing
federal constitutional challenges to the agency’s decision to revoke a CON it had
previously awarded to a facility while the facility was arranging financing for
construction). For a breakdown of relatively recent challenges to CON statutes in
the federal courts under the Commerce Clause, see Parento, supra note 24, at 233–
37.
145
203 N.C. App. 593 (2010).
141
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substantive due process challenge to the CON statute.146 In that case,
the plaintiff challenged the state’s denial of its application for a fixed
breast MRI scanner to detect and treat breast cancer.147 Although the
court acknowledged the Law of the Land Clause was meant to “limit
the state’s police power to actions which have a real or substantial
relation to the public health,” it took an extremely permissive view
when assessing “whether the means undertaken in the CON law are
reasonable in relation to this purpose.”148 In applying the rational
basis test, the court did not challenge the assertions of fact in the
preamble to the CON statute, instead holding that the reasons for
enacting the statute listed therein were legitimate, and it was
reasonable for the legislature to believe that the statute would
remedy them.149 The court’s attitude in Hope makes it doubtful that
146

Id. at 603 (“These constitutional protections have been consistently
interpreted to permit the state, through the exercise of its police power, to regulate
economic enterprises provided the regulation is rationally related to a proper
government purpose.” (quoting Poor Richard’s Inc. v. Stone, 322 N.C. 61, 64
(1988))).
147
Id. at 595.
148
Id. at 602–03; see id. at 605 (“[F]inding the statute rationally related to a
legitimate purpose where ‘the legislature could have reasonably believed that the
statute would promote [the] ends . . . .’”) (quoting Armstrong v. N.C. State Bd. of
Dental Exam’rs, 129 N.C. App. 153, 161–62 (1998)) (emphasis added)).
149
Id. at 604–05. For perspective on how the Fourth Circuit treats federal
constitutional challenges to CON statutes under a rational basis analysis, see
Colon Health Ctrs. of Am. v. Hazel, 813 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2016). In Colon Health
Centers, the Fourth Circuit rejected the out-of-state plaintiff’s argument that the
CON statute was indicative of economic protectionism, designed to benefit instate economic interests by burdening out-of-state competition. Id. at 151.
Pointing to the state’s justifications for the statute, the court held that “[a]ppellants
may be dissatisfied with the Virginia General Assembly’s policy choices in this
complex field, but we cannot discern a sinister protectionist purpose in this
straightforward effort to bring medical care to [the] citizens . . . .” Id. at 153.
Similar to the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hope, the Fourth Circuit was
completely unwilling to look into whether the state’s justifications for the CON
program were logical or supported by fact in any way, instead suggesting that the
plaintiff present its factual findings regarding the anticompetitive risks and
ineffectiveness of CON statutes to the Virginia General Assembly: “‘There was a
time’ when courts ‘rigorously scrutinize[d] economic legislation’ and ‘presumed
to make such binding judgments for society.’ But this is no longer that time, and
under rational basis review, reasonable debates such as this one are resolved in
favor of upholding state laws.” Id. at 158 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Dr. Singh’s claims under Article I, Section 19 will do much to move
the needle in the direction of invalidating the law.
It might be possible to reshape the issues, however, and convince
a court that this statutory and regulatory regime does not reasonably
relate to the state’s legitimate public health concerns. If the context
of the law shifts from a matter of public health to a purely economic
constraint, Dr. Singh’s case might be viewed as arbitrary
government action that infringes on his rights without justification.
This would require the court to take the evidence and results of the
CON program into consideration when determining whether the
CON statute passes the rational basis test.150 While it is without
question that the legislature has the inherent power to enact
reasonable legislation to protect the health of citizens, it is important
to remember that part of the judiciary’s role is to check that power
when it is being exercised in an irrational manner. Constitutional
inquiries are not isolated from reality or facts, and courts can and
should play a role in assessing whether there is reasoned logic
behind laws that restrict individual liberties.
B. North Carolina Judicial Review of Anti-Monopoly and
Exclusive Emoluments Claims
Dr. Singh’s complaint challenges the constitutionality of North
Carolina’s CON programs on two additional and related grounds:
the constitutional prohibitions against monopolies151 and exclusive

The court continues by asserting that to rule against the CON statute would be to
undermine the state’s police power, which is a fundamental aspect of the system
of federalism. Id.
150
In determining that law does not meet the legislature’s public health ends,
however, the court would need to tread carefully so as not to limit the General
Assembly’s ability to enact legislation that similarly infringes on the rights of
citizens but does function to further the state’s legitimate public health goals. See
generally Blum, supra note 25 (explaining that while CON statutes have gotten
lost along the way, they were enacted to address legitimate concerns, and rational,
long-term health care planning and regulation is necessary in the American health
care system).
151
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34 (“Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free state and shall not be allowed.”); see also Complaint, supra note
9, at 34.
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emoluments.152 There is less case law in this area, but both claims
were successful in Aston Park.153 Dr. Singh alleges that the MRICON program gives CON-holders a monopoly by awarding them
the exclusive privilege of providing MRI services and denying all
other providers from doing so.154 The complaint insists that “[t]he
purpose of the MRI-CON requirement is to protect incumbent MRI
providers from competition” and that protectionism is not a
legitimate basis for legally preventing Dr. Singh from providing safe
and affordable MRIs to patients.155 For the same reason, Dr. Singh
argues that the CON statute violates the constitutional protection
against exclusive emoluments for private actors.156 Although these
are compelling arguments, when taken with the results of CON
programs, which do functionally shield incumbent providers from
competition, it may be a stretch to argue that this was the intended
purpose. In reviewing constitutional questions, the North Carolina
Supreme Court presumes that laws enacted by the state’s General
Assembly are constitutional unless it determines that the law is
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.157 From the deference
the North Carolina courts have shown to the state’s policy goals
listed in the statute’s preamble, it seems like a court will dismiss this
type of argument as baseless and plainly contradicted by the text of
the statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether the courts will engage with these issues in
light of the substantial amount of deference given to the state when
152

N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive
or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of
public services.”); see also Complaint, supra note 9, at 34.
153
282 N.C. 542, 551 (1973).
154
Complaint, supra note 9, at 34.
155
Id.
156
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32 (“No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive
or separate emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of
public services.”); see also Complaint, supra note 9, at 35 (“A CON granted to a
private health-care provider is not a license or a contract to provide ‘public
services,’ and private CON-holders are not state agents or employees.”).
157
See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. North Carolina, 814 S.E.2d 54, 60
(2018).
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it asserts its police powers.158 If the court contextualizes the issue as
one of “public health,” there is a substantial likelihood that the
courts will decline to overturn the state law and will instead
conclude that the legislative branch is best suited to decide on the
proper course.159 This will likely be the case, even if the plaintiff
argues and sufficiently proves that the laws do not serve the public
health function that they were intended to—or that they do the
opposite of what was intended. The major problem such judicial
deference presents is that not only would the plaintiff not succeed
on the Article I, Section 19 claims, but also the anti-monopoly and
exclusive emoluments violation claims would potentially suffer the
same fate. The law tends to hold constitutional notions of equal
protection and due process among the most sacred of our rights as
Americans, so if such liberty interests give way to deference to the
state’s police power, then it is hard to think of other constitutional
rights being upheld. However, if the court is willing to look at the
issue from a different perspective, there is potential for Dr. Singh’s
claims to succeed. The idea that the legislative branch is the proper
channel for change in policy is certainly legitimate, but the
legislature has consistently failed to pass meaningful changes to
CON. Furthermore, despite impacting the daily life of North
Carolinians, the law is relatively obscure and is isolated from the
political consciousness of voters. These elements suggest that it is
time for state courts to consider taking a proactive role in
determining whether the CON statute is a legitimate exercise of the
state’s police power.

158

See Newberg, supra note 110 (analyzing the possibility of another Aston
Park-like ruling). See generally Anderson, supra note 93 (assessing the potential
success or failure of an economic substantive due process argument in a modern
court).
159
See Anderson, supra note 93, at 721–22 (explaining that although the North
Carolina Supreme Court has yet to examine the constitutionality of the
reintroduced CON program with respect to economic substantive due process, the
court’s adoption of the rational basis standard will likely produce very different
results from those seen in Aston Park in 1973).

